Recent Advances in Research on Hedge Fund Activism: Value Creation and Identification

被引:45
作者
Brav, Alon [1 ]
Jiang, Wei [2 ]
Kim, Hyunseob [3 ]
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[2] Columbia Univ, Columbia Business Sch, New York, NY 10027 USA
[3] Cornell Univ, Samuel Curtis Johnson Grad Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA
来源
ANNUAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, VOL 7 | 2015年 / 7卷
关键词
shareholder activism; corporate governance; productivity; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; LONG-TERM; SHAREHOLDER; PRODUCTIVITY; RETURNS;
D O I
10.1146/annurev-financial-111914-041751
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Hedge fund activism emerged as a major force of corporate governance in the 2000s. By the mid-2000s, there were between 150 and 200 activist hedge funds in action each year, advocating for changes in 200-300 publicly listed companies in the United States. In this article, we review the evolution and major characteristics of hedge fund activism, as well as the short- and long-term impacts of the performance and governance of targeted companies. Though most of the analyses here are based on a comprehensive sample of over 2,000 activism events in the United States from 1994 to 2011, hand-collected by the authors from regulatory filings and news searches, this article covers all major studies on the topic, including those on markets outside of the United States.
引用
收藏
页码:579 / 595
页数:17
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