Optimal team incentives with CES production

被引：30

作者：

Adams, CP ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Fed Trade Commiss, Washington, DC 20580 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 92卷 / 01期

关键词：

group incentives; profit sharing; free riding;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.01.027

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper models an optimal incentive contract and a simple partnership with CES production functions. The results suggest that when employee inputs are complements, firm-wide incentives such as profit sharing and partnerships are quite valuable, even in large firms. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：143 / 148

页数：6

共 8 条

[1]

Boning B., 2001, OPPORTUNITY COUNTS T

[2]

CHE Y, 2002, AM ECON REV, V91, P525

[3] Moral hazard and risk spreading in partnerships [J].