Models Among the Political Theorists

被引:25
作者
Johnson, James [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
关键词
RATIONAL CHOICE;
D O I
10.1111/ajps.12114
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Political theorists rely on models in ways that typically are neglected. They do so for largely the same reasons other political scientists do. Those reasons have little to do with the standard rationale political scientists advance, namely, that they use models to deduce predictions that, treated as hypotheses, can be tested against the "real world." Starting from Thomas Schelling's view of models, I show how John Rawls and Michel Foucault each rely on a model in ways that conform to his characterization. I then draw a comparison between Isaiah Berlin and Kenneth Arrow to illuminate the value of formalization. I conclude by sketching a view of models not as devices for making predictions but as tools for conceptual exploration. On that basis, I argue that the standard rationale turns out to be deeply problematic.
引用
收藏
页码:547 / 560
页数:14
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