Dis&approval voting: a characterization

被引:60
作者
Alcantud, Jose Carlos R. [1 ]
Laruelle, Annick [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Salamanca, Salamanca 37007, Spain
[2] Univ Basque Country UPV EHU, Bilbao 48015, Spain
[3] Basque Fdn Sci, IKERBASQUE, Bilbao 48011, Spain
关键词
VOTE;
D O I
10.1007/s00355-013-0766-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The voting rule considered in this paper belongs to a large class of voting systems, called "range voting" or "utilitarian voting", where each voter rates each candidate with the help of a given evaluation scale and the winner is the candidate with the highest total score. In approval voting the evaluation scale only consists of two levels: 1 (approval) and 0 (non approval). However non approval may mean disapproval or just indifference or even absence of sufficient knowledge for evaluating the candidate. In this paper we propose a characterization of a rule (that we refer to as dis&approval voting) that allows for a third level in the evaluation scale. The three levels have the following interpretation: 1 means approval, 0 means indifference, abstention or 'do not know', and means disapproval.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 10
页数:10
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