Efficiency Wages in Cournot-Oligopoly

被引：4

作者：

de Pinto, Marco ^{[1
,2
]}

Goerke, Laszlo ^{[1
,3
,4
]}

机构：

[1] Trier Univ, Inst Labour Law & Ind Relat European Union IAAEU, Behringstr 21, D-54296 Trier, Germany

[2] IUBH Univ Appl Sci, IUBH Fernstudium, Kaiserpl 1, D-83435 Bad Reichenhall, Germany

[3] CESifo Munchen, Munich, Germany

[4] IZA Bonn, Bonn, Germany

来源：

B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY | 2019年 / 19卷 / 04期

关键词：

oligopoly; efficiency wages; excessive entry; welfare; PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION; FREE-ENTRY; SOCIAL EFFICIENCY; INSUFFICIENT ENTRY; PERFORMANCE PAY; UNEMPLOYMENT; EQUILIBRIUM; EXISTENCE; ABSENCE;

D O I：

10.1515/bejeap-2018-0236

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In a Cournot-oligopoly with free but costly entry and business stealing, output per firm is too low and the number of competitors excessive, assuming labor productivity to depend on the number of employees only or to be constant. However, a firm can raise the productivity of its workforce by paying higher wages. We show that such efficiency wages accentuate the distortions occurring in oligopoly. Specifically, excessive entry is aggravated and the welfare loss due to market power rises.

引用

页数：13

共 51 条

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