Do voters vote ideologically?

被引：31

作者：

Degan, Arianna ^{[2
]}

Merlo, Antonio ^{[1
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Penn, Dept Econ, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[2] Univ Quebec Montreal, Dept Econ, Montreal, PQ, Canada

[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2009年 / 144卷 / 05期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

Voting; Spatial models; Falsifiability; Testing; CHOICE FUNCTIONS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.008

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote "ideologically" (i.e., they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically "closest" to them) testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is potentially falsifiable, and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1868 / 1894

页数：27

共 44 条

[1]

Afriat S. N., 1967, Econometrica, V8, P67, DOI DOI 10.2307/2525382

[2]

Alvarez RM., 1998, INFORM ELECTIONS

[3] MEASUREMENT AND MISMEASUREMENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SELF-REPORTED VOTE [J].