Efficiency of French privatizations: a dynamic vision

被引：16

作者：

Alexandre, H ^{[1
]}

Charreaux, G ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bourgogne, IAE, F-21066 Dijon, France

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2004年 / 10卷 / 03期

关键词：

privatization; static efficiency; dynamic efficiency; corporate governance;

D O I：

10.1016/S0929-1199(02)00044-5

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We interpret privatization in light of corporate governance theory. After replicating some traditional tests, we test our new model on a sample of privatized French firms. We cannot confirm for French privatizations the positive effect on overall static and dynamic efficiency of the firm traditionally attributed to privatizations. In addition, we find that whatever positive value accrues from privatization is affected by the contextual, organizational, governance, and strategic variables that influence the privatization process. (C) 2002 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：467 / 494

页数：28

共 19 条

[1]

BORTOLOTTI B, 1998, PRIVATISATIONS I CRO

[2]

Charreaux G., 1997, Revue Francaise de Gestion, V115, P38

[3] State-owned and privately owned firms: An empirical analysis of profitability, leverage, and labor intensity [J].