A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

被引：4

作者：

Rothschild, Daniel ^{[1
]}

Spectre, Levi ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] UCL, London, England

[2] Open Univ Israel, Raanana, Israel

来源：

NOUS | 2018年 / 52卷 / 02期

基金：

英国艺术与人文研究理事会; 以色列科学基金会;

关键词：

INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS;

D O I：

10.1111/nous.12183

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams' Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a disjunction.

引用

页码：473 / 478

页数：6

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