A natural history of belief

被引：0

作者：

Falvey, K ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Philosophy, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA

来源：

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY | 1999年 / 80卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1468-0114.00087

中图分类号：

B [哲学、宗教];

学科分类号：

01 ; 0101 ;

摘要：

Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by a conception of our propositional attitude concepts as comprising a proto-scientific causal-explanatory theory of behavior. This conception has given rise to a spate of recent worries about the prospects for 'naturalizing' the theory. In this paper I return to the roots of the 'theory-theory' of the attitudes in Wilfrid Sellars's classic 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind'. I present an alternative to the theory-theory's account of belief in the form of a parody of Sellars's 'myth of Jones', one that highlights the normative and pragmatic aspects of this concept and, hopefully, enables us to bypass questions about its physical 'realization'.

引用

页码：324 / 345

页数：22

共 21 条

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