Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities

被引：16

作者：

Koczy, Laszlo A. ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Tech Univ Budapest, Keleti Fac Econ, H-1084 Budapest, Hungary

[2] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ, NL-6200 MD Maastricht, Netherlands

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2009年 / 66卷 / 01期

关键词：

Core; Externalities; Sequential coalition formation; Order-independent equilibria; FUNCTION FORM GAMES; RECURSIVE CORE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts [Bloch, F., 1996. Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division. Games Econ. Behav. 14, 90-123]. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core [Koczy, L.A., 2007. A recursive core for partition function form games. Theory Dec. 63, 41-51]. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：559 / 565

页数：7