How to play with a biased coin?

被引：17

作者：

Gossner, O ^{[1
]}

Vieille, N

机构：

[1] Univ Paris 10, UMR 7536, THEMA, F-92001 Nanterre, France

[2] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[3] Ecole Polytech, Lab Econometrie, F-78351 Jouy En Josas, France

[4] HEC, Dept Finance & Econ, F-78351 Jouy En Josas, France

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2002年 / 41卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00507-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We characterize the max min of repeated zero-sum games in which player one plays in pure strategies conditional on the private observation of a fixed sequence of random variables. Meanwhile we introduce a definition of a strategic distance between probability measures, and relate it to the standard Kullback distance. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：206 / 226

页数：21

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