The citizen goes shopping: What do the peers have to say about it?

The mounting pressure for a minimal (neo-classical) role for neutral (liberal) governments, together with the absence of institutionalized information systems that conform with the evolving set of consumer concerns, create a political deficit in the food market: a space out of reach alike for citizens and for consumers. Therefore, when democratically elected authorities are asked to reduce their regulatory role in the market, the question becomes urgent whether the assumption of 'perfect information' (upon which neo-classical economics bases its promise to maximize the aggregate satisfaction of consumer preferences) is being reasonably met. The present paper argues that in liberal market democracies, when citizens' concerns cannot get sufficiently addressed in the political arena, then appropriate information on non-perceptible food (production) attributes must be provided in the market. Also, a set of suggestions about the use of the term 'appropriate', and about the generation of such information by means of multiple criteria models is being made. Such concerns can relate to environmental risk tolerance, health risk tolerance, metaphysical issues (referring to animal welfare and food naturalness), and socioeconomic issues (referring to human rights and distributive justice).