Institutional choice versus communication in social dilemmas - An experimental approach

被引:16
作者
Bischoff, Ivo [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Giessen, Dept Econ, D-35394 Giessen, Germany
关键词
social dilemmas; laboratory experiment; group behavior; institutional choice; communication;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2005.01.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper presents an experimental study that compares the ability of human groups to escape the tragedy of the commons through institutional change or communication. Teams of five players are placed in a dynamic CPR environment with inefficient institutional settings. The results clearly show the vital importance of communication. At the same time, the groups who were allowed to replace the inefficient institutional settings by other more appropriate rules performed worse than those groups who were not given this opportunity. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:20 / 36
页数:17
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