Long-term research and development incentives in a dynamic Cournot duopoly

被引：3

作者：

Yap, Yee Jiun ^{[1
]}

Luckraz, Shravan ^{[2
]}

Tey, Siew Kian ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Malaya, Inst Math Sci, Fac Sci, Kuala Lumpur 50603, Malaysia

[2] Univ Nottingham Ningbo China, Fac Social Sci, Sch Econ, Ningbo 315100, Zhejiang, Peoples R China

来源：

ECONOMIC MODELLING | 2014年 / 39卷

关键词：

Research and development incentive; Dynamic game; Cournot duopoly; Public good; SPILLOVERS; INNOVATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econmod.2014.02.020

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper constructs an ex-ante asymmetric R&D Cournot differential game with knowledge spillovers. It shows that in the long-run equilibrium firms have incentives to innovate as long as the knowledge externalities are bidirectional. We also carry out a series of numerical simulations of the differential game to illustrate our results. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：8 / 18

页数：11

共 24 条

[1] Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers [J].

Amir, R .

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2000, 18 (07) :1013-1032

[2] Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation [J].

Bessen, James ;

Maskin, Eric .

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2009, 40 (04) :611-635

[3] The sun also rises: Productivity convergence between Japan and the USA [J].

Cameron, G .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, 2005, 10 (04) :387-408

[4] Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R & D [J].

COHEN, WM ;

LEVINTHAL, DA .

ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 1989, 99 (397) :569-596

[5]

DASPREMONT C, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P641

[6]

DASPREMONT C, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P1133

[7] THE SEARCH FOR RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT SPILLOVERS [J].

GRILICHES, Z .

SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1992, 94 :S29-S47

[8]

Grunfeld L., 2003, WORKING PAPER

[9] TOBIN MARGINAL Q AND AVERAGE Q - A NEOCLASSICAL INTERPRETATION [J].

HAYASHI, F .

ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (01) :213-224

[10]

Henriques I., 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P641

← 1 2 3 →