Related Party Transactions and Firm Value in Indonesia: Opportunistic vs. Efficient Transactions

被引:2
作者
Wulandari, Trisninik Ratih [1 ]
Setiawan, Doddy [2 ]
Widagdo, Ari Kuncara [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sebelas Maret, Sch Vocat, Surakarta 57126, Indonesia
[2] Univ Sebelas Maret, Fac Econ & Business, Surakarta 57126, Indonesia
关键词
related party transactions; firm value; opportunistic; efficient transaction; COVID-19; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; PERFORMANCE; COMPANIES; IMPACT;
D O I
10.3390/risks10110210
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Related party transactions (RPT) are a common transaction conducted among companies and are the focus of the business world today. The purpose of this study is twofold, as follows: first, to provide empirical evidence for whether the RPT of related party loans in manufacturing companies in Indonesia is an opportunistic transaction or an efficient transaction, and second, to provide evidence for whether there are differences in company perspectives before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. This study employs data from all manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The data analysis techniques include descriptive statistical and hypothesis testing. The results of this study in the period 2018-2021 show that RPT has a positive effect on company value. During this period, that is, the years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, RPT had a negative effect on company value. In contrast, the 2020-2021 period (during the COVID-19 pandemic) shows the opposite result: RPT has a positive effect on company value. The results of this study suggest that in the 2018-2021 and the pandemic period (2020-2021), companies conducted RPT for efficiency purposes, while prior to the pandemic (2018-2019) RPT was conducted for opportunistic purposes.
引用
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页数:11
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