Equilibrium and potential in coalitional congestion games

被引：3

作者：

Kuniavsky, Sergey ^{[1
]}

Smorodinsky, Rann ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Munich, Munich Grad Sch Econ, D-80539 Munich, Germany

[2] Technion Israel Inst Technol, Fac Ind Engn & Management, IL-32000 Haifa, Israel

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 2014年 / 76卷 / 01期

关键词：

Congestion games; Equilibrium; Potential; Coalitions;

D O I：

10.1007/s11238-013-9357-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality, it is often the case that some players cooperatively decide on their joint action in order to maximize the coalition's total utility. This is modeled by Coalitional Congestion Games. Typical settings include truck drivers who work for the same shipping company, or routers that belong to the same ISP. The formation of coalitions will typically imply that the resulting coalitional congestion game will no longer posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we provide conditions under which such games are potential games and posses a pure Nash equilibrium.

引用

页码：69 / 79

页数：11