The Ultimatum Game in complex networks

We address the problem of how cooperative (altruistic-like) behavior arises in natural and social systems by analyzing an Ultimatum Game in complex networks. Specifically, players of three types are considered: (a) empathetic, whose aspiration levels, and offers, are equal, (b) pragmatic, who do not distinguish between the different roles and aim to obtain the same benefit, and (c) agents whose aspiration levels, and offers, are independent. We analyze the asymptotic behavior of pure populations with different topologies using two kinds of strategic update rules: natural selection, which relies on replicator dynamics, and social penalty, inspired by the Bak-Sneppen dynamics, in which players are subject to a social selection rule penalizing not only the less fit individuals, butalso their first neighbors. We discuss the emergence of fairness in the different settings and network topologies.