Stochastic stability in assignment problems

被引：15
|
作者：
Klaus, Bettina [1 ]
Newton, Jonathan [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Lausanne, Fac Business & Econ HEC, Internef 538, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
[2] Univ Sydney, Sch Econ, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
来源：
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS | 2016年 / 62卷
基金：
澳大利亚研究理事会; 瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词：
Assignment problem; (Core) stability; Decentralization; Stochastic stability; RANDOM-PATHS; EVOLUTION; DYNAMICS; CORE;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In a dynamic model of assignment problems, it is shown that small deviations suffice to move between stable outcomes. This result is used to obtain no-selection and almost-no-selection results under the stochastic stability concept for uniform and payoff-dependent errors. There is no-selection of partner or payoff under uniform errors, nor for agents with multiple optimal partners under payoff-dependent errors. There can be selection of payoff for agents with a unique optimal partner under payoff-dependent errors. However, when every agent has a unique optimal partner, almost-no-selection is obtained. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：62 / 74
页数：13
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