Neo-classical economics, institutional economics and improved fisheries management

被引：9

作者：

van der Burg, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Twente, Fac Publ Adm & Publ Policy, NL-7500 AE Enschede, Netherlands

来源：

MARINE POLICY | 2000年 / 24卷 / 01期

关键词：

fishery management; institutional economics; enforcement; political problems; transaction costs;

D O I：

10.1016/S0308-597X(99)00008-1

中图分类号：

X [环境科学、安全科学];

学科分类号：

08 ; 0830 ;

摘要：

According to neo-classical economists, taxes and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are the most efficient measures for dealing with the problem of overfishing. Institutional economists, however, criticise neo-classical economists for neglecting political problems, enforcement problems and transaction costs. In relation to this, they argue that taxes and ITQs have serious weaknesses as well. Taking account of both neo-classical and institutional arguments, a new management system is proposed. The system is as efficient in the neo-classical sense as taxes and ITQs, but it also has certain advantages in view of institutional aspects. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：45 / 51

页数：7

共 17 条

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