Authoritarian Survival and Poverty Traps: Land Reform in Mexico

被引：40

作者：

Albertus, Michael ^{[1
]}

Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto ^{[2
]}

Magaloni, Beatriz ^{[2
]}

Weingast, Barry R. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637 USA

[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2016年 / 77卷

关键词：

economic growth; land reform; authoritarian regimes; clientelism; redistribution; Mexico; RIGHTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.08.013

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

Why do governments in underdeveloped countries pursue policies that undercut long-term economic growth? Focusing on Mexico's massive but inefficient land reform, we argue that governments do so to underpin political survival. Using a panel dataset of Mexican states from 1917 to 1992, we find that land distribution was higher during election years and where the threat of rural unrest was greater. Furthermore, PRI support eroded more slowly in states receiving more reform. The program, which carried restrictive property rights, thus served the PRI regime's electoral interests. But while land distribution generated a loyal political clientele, it generated steep costs lower long-term economic growth. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：154 / 170

页数：17

共 55 条

[21]

de Alcantara CynthiaHewitt., 1976, MODERNIZING MEXICAN

[22]

de Janvry A., 1997, MEXICOS 2 AGRARIAN R

[23] Are land reforms granting complete property rights politically risky? Electoral outcomes of Mexico's certification program [J].