Game Analysis Between Enterprise and the Public in Environmental Governance

被引:0
|
作者
Wang, Yan [1 ]
Tao, Yujie [2 ]
机构
[1] China Univ Petr East China, Coll Sci, Qingdao, Peoples R China
[2] Tonghua Normal Univ, Coll Math, Tonghua, Peoples R China
来源
2015 4TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (ICEEP 2015) | 2015年
关键词
Environmental Governance; Game Theory; public participant; pollution control; MANAGEMENT; WATER;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
Environmental governance has become a tough task of economic development faced to regional government. It is also one of the sustainable development objectives in the long-term practice of world countries. The governance to environment can not only rely on the government's control, but also need more public power. But in practice of environmental management in our country, the public didn't play a proper role. This paper aimed to emphasize the important role and significance of public participant in environmental protection. We analyze the interest relationship between the enterprise and the public in this paper by game method. Two complete information dynamic game models are established to descript the choices of strategy for enterprises. The game equilibrium shows that the public power has important influence on the choice of strategy for enterprise. The conclusions provide the theoretical basis for the enforcement of public participant mechanism in environmental pollution control management.
引用
收藏
页码:1157 / 1161
页数:5
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