On the writing and the interpretation of contracts

被引:42
作者
Shavell, Steven [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1093/jleo/ewj017
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The major theme of this article is that the interpretation of contracts is in the interests of contracting parties. The general reasons are (a) that interpretation may improve on otherwise imperfect contracts; and (b) that the prospect of interpretation allows parties to write simpler contracts and thus to conserve on contracting effort. A method of interpretation is defined as a function whose argument is the written contract and whose value is another contract, the interpreted contract, which is what actually governs the parties' joint enterprise. It is shown that interpretation is superior to enforcement of contracts as written, and the optimal method of interpretation is analyzed.
引用
收藏
页码:289 / 314
页数:26
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]   Incomplete contracts and complexity costs [J].
Anderlini, L ;
Felli, L .
THEORY AND DECISION, 1999, 46 (01) :23-50
[2]  
ANDERLINI L, 2001, 0105 U PENNS LAW SCH
[3]  
[Anonymous], CONTRACTS
[4]   STRATEGIC CONTRACTUAL INEFFICIENCY AND THE OPTIMAL CHOICE OF LEGAL RULES [J].
AYRES, I ;
GERTNER, R .
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1992, 101 (04) :729-773
[5]   FILLING GAPS IN INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS - AN ECONOMIC-THEORY OF DEFAULT RULES [J].
AYRES, I ;
GERTNER, R .
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1989, 99 (01) :87-130
[6]   Rigidity, discretion, and the costs of writing contracts [J].
Battigalli, P ;
Maggi, G .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2002, 92 (04) :798-817
[7]  
BEBCHUK LA, 1991, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V7, P284
[9]  
Bolton P., 2005, Contract theory
[10]  
COHEN GM, 2000, ENCY LAW EC, V3, P78