Testing theories of behavior for extensive-form two-player two-stage games

被引：4
|
作者：
Stahl, Dale O. [2 ]
Haruvy, Ernan [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Texas Dallas, Dept Management, Dallas, TX 75230 USA
[2] Univ Texas Austin, Dept Econ, Austin, TX 78712 USA
来源：
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 12卷 / 02期
关键词：
Extensive-form games; Level-n; Other-regarding preferences; RATIONALITY; PREFERENCES; FAIRNESS; MODELS;
D O I：
10.1007/s10683-008-9212-6
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine choices in two-player extensive-form games that give subjects opportunities for individualistic as well as other-regarding behavior, and where each subject makes choices in a variety of games. Following an extensive search over models, where we estimate a single parameter vector for all the games rather than different parameter vectors for each game, we find that (1) the level-n model organizes the data well, (2) other-regarding behaviors in these games appear to consist primarily of egalitarian and utilitarian behaviors, and (3) there is no significant evidence for reciprocal behavior.
引用
收藏
页码：242 / 251
页数：10
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