Analysis of Multipartite Cooperative Governance of Food Safety Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

被引:0
作者
Tong, Guangji [1 ]
Qin, Li [1 ]
机构
[1] NE Forest Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Harbin 150040, Peoples R China
来源
PROCEEDINGS OF 2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, VOLS 1 AND 2 | 2009年
关键词
evolutionary game; food safety; governance; multipartite;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
This paper applies evolutionary game theory to develop a model for food safety governance and analyzes the process of which government, food supplier, and food industry association take party in food safety governance and achieve game balance. Based on the case, it demonstrates the dynamic process of which government, food supplier, and food industry association gradually achieve the goal of maximizing the tripartite benefits through communication with each other and repeated games. According to the research result, it is essential for us to take some measures to establish a coordinate institution of which the government, food supplier and food industry association participate in the food safety governance, including change the model of government oriented in food safety management, promote food supplier's self discipline, and construct the institutional environment of which the food industry associations involved in food safety management, and so on. These measures will do some help to establish the mechanism of multipartite cooperative governance in china's food safety.
引用
收藏
页码:998 / 1002
页数:5
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