Cooperation in an Assortative Matching Prisoners Dilemma Experiment with Pro-Social Dummies

被引:3
作者
Yang, Chun-Lei [1 ]
Yue, Ching-Syang Jack [2 ]
机构
[1] Nanjing Audit Univ, Econ Expt Lab, 86 Yushanxi Rd, Nanjing 211815, Jiangsu, Peoples R China
[2] Natl Chengchi Univ, Dept Stat, Taipei, Taiwan
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
EVOLUTION; PUNISHMENT; RECIPROCITY; INFORMATION; ADVANTAGE; BEHAVIOR; GAMES;
D O I
10.1038/s41598-019-50083-6
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Assortative matching (AM) can be theoretically an effective means to facilitate cooperation. We designed a controlled lab experiment with three treatments on multi-round prisoner's dilemma. With matching based on weighted history (WH) as surrogate for AM, we show that adding pro-social dummies to the WH treatment may significantly improve cooperation, compared to both the random matching and the WH treatment. In society where assortative matching is effective and promoted by the underlying culture, institutional promotion of virtue role models can be interpreted as generating additional pro-social dummies, so as to move the initial state of cooperators into the basin of attraction for a highly cooperative polymorphic equilibrium.
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页数:8
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