With the publication of the work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty became an important target of criticism directed by the interpreters of classical pragmatism and commentators of John Dewey. These critics consider that while classical pragmatism was an attempt to understand and create a new structure that would legitimize scientific research, Rorty's pragmatism asserted itself by abandoning its own attempt to learn more about the nature and the conditions of adequacy of the investigation. Dewey never completely turned his back on metaphysics, which is particularly present in the work Experience and Nature[Experience and Nature] (1925). However, Rorty intended to find in Dewey, above all, in the latter's social and political philosophy, an anticipation of his own vision of philosophy. So, deliberately, Rorty separated the "good" (historicist) from the "bad" (metaphysical) Dewey and considered the Dewey Experience and Nature book publication inappropriate . In this article we will focus on the contribution of the critics of Rorty, Thelma Lavine and James Gouinlock against the Rortyan strategy of splitting Dewey in two and will support an interpretation that articulates the two dimensions of Deweyana philosophy: the historicist and the scientist. In this perspective, we will take Rorty and pragmatism as a priority source . The philosopher responds to his critics(1995) that addresses the dialogue between Rorty and these authors. Then we will present our objections both to the hypothesis of a solely historicist and anti-foundationist Dewey and to that of a solely scientist Dewey. According to our interpretation, we consider such proposals as strategies from the same source, that is, the attempt to update Dewey to adapt it to the neopragmatist conceptual framework.
