On ''reputation'' refinements with heterogeneous beliefs

被引：10

作者：

Battigalli, P ^{[1
]}

Watson, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,DEPT ECON,LA JOLLA,CA 92093

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2171897

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：369 / 374

页数：6

共 9 条

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Battigalli, P .

[2]

BATTIGALLI P, 1994, UNPUB GIOCHI AD INFO

[3]

CRIPPS M, 1993, A410 U BONN

FUDENBERG, D ;

LEVINE, DK .

[5]

GUL F, 1991, 1991 STANF U GRAD SC

SCHMIDT, KM .

[7] Reputation in repeated games with no discounting [J].

Watson, J .

[8] A REPUTATION REFINEMENT WITHOUT EQUILIBRIUM [J].

WATSON, J .

[9]

WATSON J, 1994, 9420 UCSD