Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies

被引:5
作者
Donnini, Chiara [1 ]
Graziano, Maria Gabriella [2 ,3 ]
Pesce, Marialaura [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Napoli Parthenope, Dipartimento Stat & Matemat Ric Econ, Naples, Italy
[2] Univ Naples Federico II, Dipartimento Matemat & Stat, Naples, Italy
[3] CSEF, Naples, Italy
关键词
Equity; Envy; Efficiency; Asymmetric information; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; EFFICIENCY; CORE; ALLOCATIONS; EQUITY; ENVY;
D O I
10.1007/s00712-012-0322-4
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In this paper we propose a concept of coalitional fair allocation in order to solve the tension that may exist between efficiency and envy-freeness when agents are asymmetrically informed and the equity of allocations is evaluated at the interim stage.
引用
收藏
页码:55 / 68
页数:14
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