Coalitional fairness in interim differential information economies

被引：5

作者：

Donnini, Chiara ^{[1
]}

Graziano, Maria Gabriella ^{[2
,3
]}

Pesce, Marialaura ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Napoli Parthenope, Dipartimento Stat & Matemat Ric Econ, Naples, Italy

[2] Univ Naples Federico II, Dipartimento Matemat & Stat, Naples, Italy

[3] CSEF, Naples, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2014年 / 111卷 / 01期

关键词：

Equity; Envy; Efficiency; Asymmetric information; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; EFFICIENCY; CORE; ALLOCATIONS; EQUITY; ENVY;

D O I：

10.1007/s00712-012-0322-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper we propose a concept of coalitional fair allocation in order to solve the tension that may exist between efficiency and envy-freeness when agents are asymmetrically informed and the equity of allocations is evaluated at the interim stage.

引用

页码：55 / 68

页数：14

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