Knowledge transfer in buyer-supplier relationships: The role of transactional and relational governance mechanisms

被引:71
作者
Liu, Yi [1 ]
Li, Yao [2 ]
Shi, Linda Hui [3 ]
Liu, Ting [4 ]
机构
[1] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai 200240, Peoples R China
[2] Tianjin Univ Technol, Sch Management, Tianjin 300384, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Victoria, Gustavson Sch Business, Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2, Canada
[4] Shanghai Univ, Sch Management, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Contract; Transaction-specific investment; Trust; Personal relationship; Knowledge transfer quantity and credibility; ABSORPTIVE-CAPACITY; FORMAL CONTRACTS; SOCIAL-STRUCTURE; PERFORMANCE; MARKET; OPPORTUNISM; INFORMATION; NETWORKS; GUANXI; TIES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.12.024
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Transferring a quantity of credible knowledge is a key competitive advantage for vertical relationships in an emerging economy. Distinct from extant research focused on the relational performance of and opportunism in channel relationships or knowledge transfer in horizontal alliances, this study investigates knowledge transfer in vertical relationships and considers how transactional and relational mechanisms differentially affect knowledge transfer quantity and credibility. Hierarchical regression analyses of 225 paired buyers and suppliers in China revealed that both transactional and relational mechanisms effectively improve quantity and credibility; within a transactional mechanism framework, contracts more effectively increase quantity, whereas transaction-specific investments do not increase credibility more effectively than contracts; and, trust more effectively improves both quantity and credibility in the relational mechanism framework than personal relationships. These findings provide new insights for the knowledge management literature and practices in vertical relationships. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:285 / 293
页数:9
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