Dual-channel decision in a shopping complex when considering consumer channel preference

被引:49
作者
Yu, Yugang [1 ]
Sun, Libo [1 ]
Guo, Xiaolong [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Management, Hefei 230026, Anhui, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Dual-channel; platform-based supply chain; agency selling; platform retailing; direct channel; channel selection; SUPPLY-CHAIN; STRATEGIC ANALYSIS; COORDINATION; PRICE; SELECTION; PLATFORM; DESIGN; MODEL; COMPETITION; WHOLESALE;
D O I
10.1080/01605682.2019.1621221
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
In practice, dual-channel structures are commonly adopted by manufacturers to reach a wider range of customers. This paper investigates a manufacturer's dual-channel ("direct" + "indirect") decision in a shopping complex, considering consumer channel preference between the direct and indirect channels, with the choices for the indirect channel being reselling and agency selling. We develop an analytical framework to study this problem. Our result demonstrates that the dual-channel structures should be adopted when there exists a significant channel preference gap between channels, which in turn could help the manufacturer reduce the substitution effect between channels. Besides, our analysis discloses that consumer channel preference plays a significant role when the manufacturer leverages different indirect selling formats. In the case of reselling, the manufacturer should adopt a dual-channel structure if consumers show a much higher preference for the direct channel. In the case of agency selling, a dual-channel structure should be adopted when consumers significantly prefer either the direct channel or the indirect (agency) platform. Finally, exact conditions are provided in this paper to help manufacturers make optimal dual-channel decisions in shopping complexes.
引用
收藏
页码:1638 / 1656
页数:19
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