Temporal Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks: Theory and Practice

被引:30
作者
Kamat, Pandurang [1 ]
Xu, Wenyuan [1 ]
Trappe, Wade [1 ]
Zhang, Yanyong [1 ]
机构
[1] Rutgers State Univ, Wireless Informat Network Lab WINLAB, N Brunswick, NJ 08902 USA
关键词
Security; Algorithms; Design; Measurement; Performance; Theory; Sensor networks; privacy; security; temporal privacy; SECURITY;
D O I
10.1145/1614379.1614380
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
Although the content of sensor messages describing "events of interest" may be encrypted to provide confidentiality, the context surrounding these events may also be sensitive and therefore should be protected from eavesdroppers. An adversary armed with knowledge of the network deployment, routing algorithms, and the base-station (data sink) location can infer the temporal patterns of interesting events by merely monitoring the arrival of packets at the sink, thereby allowing the adversary to remotely track the spatio-temporal evolution of a sensed event. In this paper we introduce the problem of temporal privacy for delay-tolerant sensor networks, and propose adaptive buffering at intermediate nodes on the source-sink routing path to obfuscate temporal information from the adversary. We first present the effect of buffering on temporal privacy using an information-theoretic formulation, and then examine the effect that delaying packets has on buffer occupancy. We observe that temporal privacy and efficient buffer utilization are contrary objectives, and then present an adaptive buffering strategy that effectively manages these tradeoffs. Finally, we evaluate our privacy enhancement strategies using simulations, where privacy is quantified in terms of the adversary's mean square error.
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页数:24
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