GIVING DUALISM ITS DUE

被引：44
作者：
Lycan, William G. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ N Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA
来源：
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY | 2009年 / 87卷 / 04期
关键词：
INTERACTIONISM; SENSATIONS;
D O I：
10.1080/00048400802340642
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind-body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered.
引用
收藏
页码：551 / 563
页数：13
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