Research of the exercise price for executive stock options

被引：0

作者：

Yang Liu-qing ^{[1
]}

Wei Min-tang ^{[1
]}

Qu Yi-ping ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Xian Jiaotong Univ, Sch Management, Xian 710049, Peoples R China

来源：

Proceedings of 2004 Chinese Control and Decision Conference | 2004年

关键词：

executive stock options; company cost; executive value; exercise price; incentive;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];

学科分类号：

0812 ;

摘要：

Risk-averse executive is different from the risk-neutrality assumption of the basis of Black-Scholes option price theory. So the company cost is different from the executive value, and the executive incentive from stock options should be the derivative of the executive value with respect to the stock price. On the base of this theory, at the money option is better than premium and discounted options; if the stock price below the exercise price, option price is benefit for company and executive.

引用

页码：745 / 748

页数：4

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