Richard Swinburne's argument to the simplicity of God via the infinite

被引：5

作者：

Gwiazda, Jeremy ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CUNY, Grad Ctr, Dept Philosophy, New York, NY 10016 USA

来源：

RELIGIOUS STUDIES | 2009年 / 45卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1017/S0034412509990217

中图分类号：

B9 [宗教];

学科分类号：

010107 ;

摘要：

In The Coherence of Theism Richard Swinburne writes that a person cannot be omniscient and perfectly free. In The Existence of God Swinburne writes that God is a person who is omniscient and perfectly free. There is a straightforward reason why the two passages are not in tension, but recognition of this reason raises a problem for Swinburne's argument in The Existence of God (the conclusion of which is that God likely exists). In this paper I present the problem for Swinburne's argument. I then consider two potential responses and suggest that neither succeeds.

引用

页码：487 / 493

页数：7