Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment

被引:120
作者
Offerman, T [1 ]
Potters, J
Sonnemans, J
机构
[1] Univ Amsterdam, NL-1012 WX Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Tilburg Univ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1467-937X.00233
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine the force of three types of behavioural dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking the successful firm, (2) rules based on following the exemplary firm, and (3) rules based on belief learning. Theoretically, these three types of rules lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot-Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments, each of which is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, behavioural rules, and outcomes.
引用
收藏
页码:973 / 997
页数:25
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