On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model

被引:36
作者
Arnold, Lutz G. [1 ]
Riley, John G. [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Regensburg, Dept Econ, D-93040 Regensburg, Germany
[2] Univ Calif Los Angeles, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90095 USA
关键词
IMPERFECT INFORMATION; ADVERSE SELECTION; MARKETS;
D O I
10.1257/aer.99.5.2012
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Contrary to what is usually assumed, the expected revenue for lenders as a function of the loan rate cannot be globally hump-shaped in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model with a continuum of types. This has important implications. First, if there is credit rationing, there must be at least two equilibrium loan rates. Second, while at the low rate loans are rationed, all those applicants willing to pay the high rate are then served. Numerical analysis shows that unless the joint distribution of risk class and output is rather special, the two loan rate outcome with rationing is unlikely.
引用
收藏
页码:2012 / 2021
页数:10
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