Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence?

被引:22
作者
Hass, Lars Helge [1 ]
Johan, Sofia [2 ,3 ]
Schweizer, Denis [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lancaster, Sch Management, Lancaster LA1 4YX, England
[2] York Univ, Schulich Sch Business, 4700 Keele St, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
[3] Tilburg Law & Econ Ctr, Tilburg, Netherlands
[4] Concordia Univ, 1455 Maisonneuve Blvd West, Montreal, PQ H3G 1M8, Canada
[5] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Vallendar, Germany
关键词
Board structure; China; Corporate governance; Performance persistence; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; LARGE SHAREHOLDERS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; PANEL-DATA; BOARD; MANAGEMENT; DIRECTORS; PAY; POWER;
D O I
10.1007/s10551-014-2385-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper examines the relationship between performance persistence and corporate governance (as proxied for by board characteristics and shareholder structure). We document systematic differences in performance persistence across listed companies in China during 2001-2011, and empirically demonstrate that firms with better corporate governance show higher performance persistence. The results are robust over both the short and long terms. We also find that performance persistence is an important factor in refinancing, and it can lower companies' costs of borrowing. Overall, our findings offer important implications for business ethics, as we demonstrate how corporate governance can lower companies' costs of debt.
引用
收藏
页码:575 / 592
页数:18
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