Equal egocentric bias in school-aged children with and without autism spectrum disorders

被引:14
作者
Begeer, Sander [1 ,2 ]
Bernstein, Daniel M. [3 ]
Assfalg, Andre [3 ,4 ]
Azdad, Halima [1 ]
Glasbergen, Tessa [1 ]
Wierda, Marlies [1 ]
Koot, Hans M. [1 ]
机构
[1] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Fac Behav & Movement Sci, Sect Clin Dev Psychol, Amsterdam, Netherlands
[2] Univ Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
[3] Kwantlen Polytech Univ, Dept Psychol, Surrey, BC V3W 2M8, Canada
[4] Univ Freiburg, Hugstetter Str 55, D-79106 Freiburg, Germany
关键词
Autism; Theory of mind; Egocentric bias; Adolescent; Hindsight; False belief; SOCIAL RESPONSIVENESS SCALE; FALSE-BELIEF; HINDSIGHT BIAS; INTELLIGENCE SCALE; MIND DEVELOPMENT; ADULTS; KNOWLEDGE; VOCABULARY; REPRESENTATION; METAANALYSIS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jecp.2015.10.018
中图分类号
B844 [发展心理学(人类心理学)];
学科分类号
040202 ;
摘要
Egocentric bias is a core feature of autism. This phenomenon has been studied using the false belief task. However, typically developing children who pass categorical (pass or fail) false belief tasks may still show subtle egocentric bias. We examined 7- to 13-year-old children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD; n = 76) or typical development (n = 113) using tasks with a continuous response scale: a modified false belief task and a visual hindsight bias task. All children showed robust egocentric bias on both tasks, but no group effects were found. Our large sample size, coupled with our sensitive tasks and resoundingly null group effects, indicate that children with and without ASD possess more similar egocentric tendencies than previously reported. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:15 / 26
页数:12
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