Agents with and without principals

被引:89
作者
Bertrand, M
Mullainathan, S
机构
[1] NBER, New York, NY USA
[2] MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.90.2.203
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:203 / 208
页数:6
相关论文
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