Strategic R&D policy and appropriability

被引：14

作者：

Miyagiwa, K ^{[1
]}

Ohno, Y ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] OREGON STATE UNIV,DEPT ECON,CORVALLIS,OR 97331

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 1997年 / 42卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

R&D subsidy; innovation; strategic trade policy; patent length; appropriability;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-1996(96)01448-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The Spencer-Brander argument for strategic R&D policy (Review of Economic Studies, 1983, 50, 702-722) is re-examined within an intertemporal model of stochastic innovation. It is shown that an optimal policy is independent of the choice of strategic variables in product market competition but sensitive to the appropriability of the new technology. At low or high degrees of appropriability R&D taxes are an optimal policy but at intermediate degrees R&D subsidies may be optimal. The paper explains why these results differ from Bagwell and Staiger's finding (International Economic Review:, 1992, 33, 795-816; Journal of International Economics, 1994, 36, 133-150) that R&D subsidies are an optimal policy in the presence of uncertainty. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.

引用

页码：125 / 148

页数：24

共 18 条

[1] THE SENSITIVITY OF STRATEGIC AND CORRECTIVE R-AND-D POLICY IN BATTLES FOR MONOPOLY [J].