Viewing Family Firm Behavior and Governance Through the Lens of Agency and Stewardship Theories

被引:200
作者
Madison, Kristen [1 ]
Holt, Daniel T. [1 ]
Kellermanns, Franz W. [2 ,3 ]
Ranft, Annette L. [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Mississippi State Univ, Coll Business, Management, Mississippi State, MS 39762 USA
[2] Univ N Carolina, Belk Coll Business, Management, Carolina Charlotte, NC USA
[3] WHU Otto Beisheim Sch Management, Ctr Family Business, Vallendar, Germany
[4] Univ Tennessee, Acad Affairs, Knoxville, TN USA
[5] Univ Tennessee, Haslam Coll Business, Business, Knoxville, TN USA
关键词
agency theory; stewardship theory; family firm performance; governance; ENTREPRENEURIAL RISK-TAKING; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES; DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; LEADERSHIP PERSPECTIVE; SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH; EMPIRICAL-EXAMINATION; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; BUSINESS CREATION;
D O I
10.1177/0894486515594292
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Agency and stewardship theories are prominent perspectives to examine myriad issues within family firms. Although considered opposing theories, both address the same phenomena: the individual-level behaviors and firm-level governance mechanisms that predict organizational outcomes. Accordingly, we review and synthesize these theories concurrently, using the concepts of behavior and governance as our organizing framework. Our review encompasses 107 family firm articles grounded in agency and/or stewardship theory, published between 2000 and 2014 in 24 journals across several disciplines. Additionally, we identify future research areas that provide scholars opportunities to push theoretical boundaries and offer further insights into the family firm.
引用
收藏
页码:65 / 93
页数:29
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