Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players

被引：11

作者：

Krishna, R. Vijay ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Edinburgh, Dept Econ, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, Midlothian, Scotland

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2007年 / 132卷 / 01期

关键词：

Bayesian games; cheap-communication; unmediated communication;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that for any two-player game of incomplete information, any rational mediated communication mechanism outcome (satisfying a Nash domination condition) can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a cheap-communication extension of the original game. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：584 / 592

页数：9

共 33 条

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[33] Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information [J].

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GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2023, 140 :341-347

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