We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that for any two-player game of incomplete information, any rational mediated communication mechanism outcome (satisfying a Nash domination condition) can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a cheap-communication extension of the original game. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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South China Agr Univ, Coll Math & Informat, Guangzhou 510642, Guangdong, Peoples R ChinaSouth China Agr Univ, Coll Math & Informat, Guangzhou 510642, Guangdong, Peoples R China
Situ, Haozhen
Huang, Zhiming
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Wuyi Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Jiangmen 529020, Peoples R ChinaSouth China Agr Univ, Coll Math & Informat, Guangzhou 510642, Guangdong, Peoples R China
Huang, Zhiming
Zhang, Cai
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South China Agr Univ, Coll Math & Informat, Guangzhou 510642, Guangdong, Peoples R ChinaSouth China Agr Univ, Coll Math & Informat, Guangzhou 510642, Guangdong, Peoples R China