Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players

被引:11
|
作者
Krishna, R. Vijay [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Edinburgh, Dept Econ, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, Midlothian, Scotland
关键词
Bayesian games; cheap-communication; unmediated communication;
D O I
10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that for any two-player game of incomplete information, any rational mediated communication mechanism outcome (satisfying a Nash domination condition) can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a cheap-communication extension of the original game. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:584 / 592
页数:9
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