On the Ethics of "Non-Corporate" Insider Trading

被引:2
作者
Blau, Benjamin M. [1 ]
Griffith, Todd G. [1 ]
Whitby, Ryan J. [1 ]
机构
[1] Utah State Univ, Jon M Huntsman Sch Business, Dept Econ & Finance, 3565 Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322 USA
关键词
Insider trading; Market quality; Insider trading laws; STOCK Act; Corruption; MARKET; RETURNS; INFORMATION; LIQUIDITY; ASK;
D O I
10.1007/s10551-021-04739-x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The ethical considerations of insider trading have been widely debated in the academic literature (see e.g., Moore in J Bus Ethics 9(3):171-182, 1990). In 2013, the STOCK Act, which was initially passed to mitigate insider trading by government officials, was quickly and unexpectedly amended to allow certain government employees to withhold their financial information. To identify and quantify the potential costs placed on investors by non-corporate insider traders, we use the unusual circumstances surrounding this amendment. For a sample of stocks most held by members of Congress, we find that, relative to control stocks, liquidity significantly worsens and volatility increases during the post-amendment period. Our results highlight the costs that are incurred by investors in the presence of non-corporate insider trading. These findings call for a stronger development of an ethical framework that justifies the restriction of all types of insider trading.
引用
收藏
页码:79 / 93
页数:15
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