Family Firms;
Outside CEO;
Board Control;
Debt Policy;
Entrepreneurial Risk Taking;
SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH;
PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT;
CAPITAL STRUCTURE;
AGENCY COSTS;
RISK-TAKING;
BUSINESSES;
OWNERSHIP;
PERFORMANCE;
GOVERNANCE;
SUCCESSION;
D O I:
10.1016/j.jfbs.2017.01.002
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We investigate how the presence of an-outside CEO is related to the financing policy of privately held family firms, taking into account the degree of family control via the board of directors. For a sample of 367 Belgian firms we find that family firms with an outside CEO have a lower leverage, although they take more entrepreneurial risk. The negative relation between the presence of an outside CEO and leverage is more pronounced for long-term debt than for short-term debt. Family control via the board of directors reduces the effect of an outside CEO on entrepreneurial risk and leverage. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机构:
NYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, Salomon Brothers Ctr, New York, NY 10012 USANYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, Salomon Brothers Ctr, New York, NY 10012 USA
Altman, EI
Saunders, A
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
NYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, Salomon Brothers Ctr, New York, NY 10012 USANYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, Salomon Brothers Ctr, New York, NY 10012 USA
机构:
NYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, Salomon Brothers Ctr, New York, NY 10012 USANYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, Salomon Brothers Ctr, New York, NY 10012 USA
Altman, EI
Saunders, A
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
NYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, Salomon Brothers Ctr, New York, NY 10012 USANYU, Leonard N Stern Sch Business, Salomon Brothers Ctr, New York, NY 10012 USA