Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection

被引:105
作者
Traulsen, Arne [1 ]
Nowak, Martin A.
Pacheco, Jorge M.
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Program Evolutionary Dynam, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Harvard Univ, Dept Math, Dept Organism & Evolutionary Biol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Fac Ciencias, Dept Fis, Ctr Fis Teor & Computac, P-1649003 Lisbon, Portugal
关键词
evolutionary game theory; stochastic effects;
D O I
10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.008
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
We study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in populations of finite size. Moreover, each individual has a randomly distributed number of interactions with other individuals. Therefore, the payoff of two individuals using the same strategy can be different. The resulting "payoff stochasticity" reduces the intensity of selection and therefore increases the temperature of selection. A simple mean-field approximation is derived that captures the average effect of the payoff stochasticity. Correction terms to the mean-field theory are computed and discussed. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:349 / 356
页数:8
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