Corruption, environmental regulation and market entry

被引：9
作者：
Biswas, Amit K. [1 ]
Thum, Marcel [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] Visva Bharati Univ, Santini Ketan, W Bengal, India
[2] Tech Univ Dresden, Fac Business & Econ, D-01062 Dresden, Germany
[3] IfoDresden, Dresden, Germany
[4] CESifo, Munich, Germany
来源：
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS | 2017年 / 22卷 / 01期
关键词：
PERMIT MARKETS; POLLUTION; STANDARDS; EMISSIONS; ECONOMICS; TAXATION; GROWTH; POLICY; FIRMS; POWER;
D O I：
10.1017/S1355770X16000218
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The authors develop a simple analytical framework to study the welfare-maximizing environmental standards when market entry is endogenous and firms can circumvent regulation by bribing corrupt officials. Corruption changes the tradeoff in environmental policy. Corruption leads more polluting firms to enter into the market, which requires tighter environmental regulation. However, corruption also makes trading in some environmental protection for a marginally higher market entry optimal for the government.
引用
收藏
页码：66 / 83
页数：18
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