Exploring the Impact of Internal Corporate Governance on the Relation Between Disclosure Quality and Earnings Management in the UK Listed Companies

被引:98
作者
Katmon, Nooraisah [1 ]
Al Farooque, Omar [2 ]
机构
[1] Sultan Idris Educ Univ, Fac Business & Econ, Tg Malim 35900, Perak, Malaysia
[2] Univ New England, Sch Business, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia
关键词
Internal corporate governance mechanisms; Disclosure quality; Earnings management; Agency theory; UK listed companies; AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS; BOARD COMPOSITION; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; SAMPLE SELECTION; ACCRUALS QUALITY; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; FORECAST ACCURACY; PERFORMANCE; FIRM; DETERMINANTS;
D O I
10.1007/s10551-015-2752-8
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study investigates the impact of internal corporate governance on the relation between disclosure quality and earnings management in the UK listed companies, in particular whether governance mechanisms have deterrent effect on earnings management similar to firms' disclosure quality. Unlike prior literature, we measure a number of board and audit committee-related governance instruments, three disclosure quality proxies (i.e. Investor Relation Magazine Award, Forward-Looking Disclosure and Analyst Forecast Accuracy) and the Modified Jones Model to test the hypotheses of the study on a matched-pair sample data of Investor Relation Magazine Award winning and non-winning firms. Our findings in the OLS and sensitivity analyses using Heckman Procedure and 2SLS regressions consistently report a significant negative association between earnings management and disclosure quality for all proxies in restraining earnings management. In contrast, corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly related to earnings management. This provides an emerging trend of the outperformance of disclosure quality over internal governance mechanisms in lessening earnings management. These findings warrant due attention of the policy makers, investors, corporate firms and other stakeholders in shaping a high-quality disclosure and governance regime in corporate settings to mitigate managerial manipulations of earnings across the countries in the world.
引用
收藏
页码:345 / 367
页数:23
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