Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion

被引：55

作者：

Barbot, Cristina ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Fac Econ Porto, CEF UP, P-4200464 Oporto, Portugal

来源：

TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL | 2009年 / 43卷 / 10期

关键词：

Airport competition; Vertical collusion; FRANCISCO BAY AREA; MARKET POWER; CONGESTION; MODEL; FORECLOSURE; CARRIERS; CAPACITY; MERGERS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.trb.2009.04.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper develops a model of airport and airline competition in a three-stage game. We analyse incentives for vertical collusion between one airport and one airline that compete with another airport and another airline, by means of static and dynamic games. We find that incentives for collusion exist when airports and airlines have different market sizes and, under certain conditions. also when secondary airports and low cost airlines compete with main airports and full service airlines. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：952 / 965

页数：14

共 22 条

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