Labor Rights, Venture Capital, and Firm Performance
被引:11
作者:
Xing, Xuejing
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机构:
Univ Alabama, Coll Business, Finance, Huntsville, AL 35899 USAUniv Alabama, Coll Business, Finance, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
Xing, Xuejing
[1
]
Howe, John S.
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机构:
Univ Missouri, Finance, Columbia, MO USA
Univ Missouri, Trulaske Coll Business, Columbia, MO USAUniv Alabama, Coll Business, Finance, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
Howe, John S.
[2
,3
]
Anderson, Randy I.
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机构:
Griffin Capital Asset Management, El Segundo, CA USAUniv Alabama, Coll Business, Finance, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
Anderson, Randy I.
[4
]
Yan, Shan
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机构:
Susquehanna Univ, Dept ofManagement, Finance, Selinsgrove, PA USAUniv Alabama, Coll Business, Finance, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
Yan, Shan
[5
]
机构:
[1] Univ Alabama, Coll Business, Finance, Huntsville, AL 35899 USA
[2] Univ Missouri, Finance, Columbia, MO USA
[3] Univ Missouri, Trulaske Coll Business, Columbia, MO USA
[4] Griffin Capital Asset Management, El Segundo, CA USA
[5] Susquehanna Univ, Dept ofManagement, Finance, Selinsgrove, PA USA
We investigate the role of labor unions in the performance of venture capital (VC)-backed firms. Using a large sample of initial public offering firms from 1983 to 2013, we find that VC-backed firms in highly unionized industries have lower Tobin's Q and are less likely to survive. This effect is robust to endogeneity concerns and to controlling for industry and firm characteristics. The findings suggest that strong labor rights impede innovative firms' performance and survival, thereby adversely affecting innovation, economic growth, and employment.